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Exploring the mechanisms of cognitive control is central
to understanding how we control our behaviour. These
mechanisms can be studied in conflict paradigms, which
require the inhibition of irrelevant responses to perform the
task. It has been suggested that in these tasks, the detection of
conflict enhances cognitive control resulting in improved
conflict resolution of subsequent trials. If this is the case, then
this so-called congruency sequence effect can be expected to
occur in cross-domain tasks. Previous research on the domain-
generality of the effect presented inconsistent results. In this
study, we provide a multi-site replication of three previous
experiments of Kan et al. (Kan IP, Teubner-Rhodes S, Drummey
AB, Nutile L, Krupa L, Novick JM 2013 Cognition 129, 637–651)
which test congruency sequence effect between very different
domains: from a syntactic to a non-syntactic domain
(Experiment 1), and from a perceptual to a verbal domain
(Experiments 2 and 3). Despite all our efforts, we found only
partial support for the claims of the original study. With a
single exception, we could not replicate the original findings;
the data remained inconclusive or went against the theoretical







































In day-to-day life, we often need to override automatic behaviours or habitual responses in order to reach
certain goals. Most of us can relate to having to tear ourselves away from appealing foods at the store in
order to make a timely supermarket run or to meet certain nutrition goals. One key factor in overriding
pre-potent responses is cognitive control, which is broadly defined as the collection of processes which
contribute to the generation of a goal-relevant response [1]. Cognitive control is typically studied
using conflict paradigms, which requires the inhibition of irrelevant stimuli, features or a habitual
response to perform the task. One such paradigm is the Stroop task [2].
In a typical Stroop trial, participants are presentedwith colourwords in various print colours but are only
tasked with indicating the print colour. Congruent trials are those in which the word and ink colour are the
same (e.g. ‘BLUE’ in the colour blue); on incongruent trials, the word and the ink colour are different (e.g.
‘BLUE’ in the colour red). Typical findings of the Stroop task are that responses on incongruent trials are
slower and less accurate compared to congruent trials due to the conflict between the word and its ink
colour. Since the Conflict Monitoring Theory [3] posits that the detection of conflict triggers cognitive
control mechanisms,1 these mechanisms can be studied by comparing performance on the incongruent
trials with responses on congruent trials. Greater cognitive control is thought to be reflected in smaller
differences between congruent and incongruent trials in terms of accuracy and speed.
Previous studies have also found that congruency effects are smaller following incongruent trials
rather than congruent trials, called the congruency sequence effect (also known as conflict adaptation or
Gratton effect, [4]). However, Egner [5] proposed that the recruitment of control occurs only following
the detection of the same type of conflict (e.g. Stroop conflict). Therefore, this hypothesis suggests that
the overlap of stimulus dimensions between the conflict tasks is a central determinant of the transfer
of control. If the congruency sequence effect is domain-general then it could be expected that
cognitive control can be sustained across seemingly different tasks. For testing this hypothesis,
researchers use cross-task adaptation designs in which one type of conflict task (e.g. a verbal Stroop
task) is followed by a different type of conflict task (e.g. a non-verbal Flanker task). In the case of
domain-generality, we should expect the effect on cross-tasks as well. Conversely, if the congruency
sequence effect is domain-specific, cross-domain adaptation should not be observable.
Some early studies gave support for domain-generality ([6–8], Condition 1), while others have not
found the effect ([8], Condition 2, [9–11]), for a summary, see Braem et al. [12]. One proposed
possibility for these mixed findings was that two different conflict sources (e.g. stimulus location and
stimulus feature) were simultaneously present in the designs [13]. In these cases, it is possible that the
cross-task adaptation effect became masked when incongruity in one feature was presented with
congruency in the other feature creating weaker conflict signals compared to the cases that induce
incongruity in both of the features.
To address these challenges, Kan et al. [13] used a novel design in which ‘conflict adaptation’was tested
between entirely different domains. In their first experiment, participants were given sentences with or
without syntactic conflict, followed by a Stroop trial. Syntactic conflict was manipulated using garden
path sentences, which are sentences that lure the reader into one interpretation, while a clause at the end
forces the reader to reanalyse the sentence, revealing its true meaning. For example, the sentence: ‘The
basketball player accepted the contract would have to be negotiated’, is ambiguous without reinterpreting
the sentence after it is read in its entirety. To eliminate this conflict, inserting ‘that’ after ‘accepted’ would
disambiguate the sentence. The results showed that the detection of syntactic conflict on the sentence
trials enhanced conflict resolution on the subsequent, non-syntactic Stroop tasks. In their second and third
experiment, the Stroop task was preceded by a non-verbal, purely perceptual task. These designs were
meant to test whether cross-task adaptation can be generalized beyond the verbal domain. The Necker
cube [14] was also adopted for this study, as it can create ambiguity by inducing two different perceptual
percepts. If this bistable stimulus leads to conflicting experience, then the congruency sequence effect can
be expected in the subsequent Stroop trial. Compared to Stroop trials after stable, unambiguous versions
of the cube, accuracy measures reflected enhanced cognitive control after the experience of conflict,
providing support for cross-task adaptation. These results provide a strong argument that the detection of
conflict in one domain can enhance control mechanisms in a different domain.
Hsu & Novick [15] found evidence for the domain-generality of the congruency sequence effect in
reversed setting, when following incongruent Stroop trials, the listeners’ ability improved in revising1While there are other approaches in which conflict detection/experience is not the direct trigger of control engagement, we deliberate





































1 temporarily ambiguous spoken instructions that induce brief misinterpretation. Other research also
claimed the cross-task adaptation of conflict and showed that the effect is the largest when the tasks
depend on the same cognitive-control mechanism [16].
However, a number of studies seem to support the domain or dimensional specificity of the
congruency sequence effect. For example, Feldman et al. [17] analysed event-related potential in a Go/
NoGo task using various NoGo decision criteria (i.e. when (not) to go) across the trials. The results of
response time, response accuracy and event-related potential analyses indicated the presence of the
congruency sequence effect only when the same NoGo decision criterion was applied across the
consecutive trials. Conflict-specificity (or lack of domain-generality) of cognitive control was further
supported in several studies [18–23].
The exploration of the neural background of conflict-control also shows an inconsistent set of
results. While some studies supported complete domain-specificity [24–26], others found evidence for
domain-generality [27] or a hybrid architecture of the two [28].
In summary, although research on the domain-generality of the congruency sequence effect has the
potential to reveal important fundamental aspects of cognitive control mechanisms, the empirical data
collected provide mixed evidence for cross-domain adaptation effect. Notably, most arguments against
domain-generality are based on the absence of evidence, leaving the possibility open that those
designs lacked sensitivity or sample size to detect the effect of interest. For these reasons, it is an
advisable strategy to investigate the question by replicating a study which had provided empirical
support for domain-generality. We decided to conduct a direct replication of Kan et al.’s [13] all three
experiments for the following reasons:
(1) these three experiments tested the congruency sequence effect between very different domains: from
a syntactic to a non-syntactic domain (Experiment 1), and from a perceptual to a verbal domain
(Experiments 2 and 3);
(2) they provided strong and influential evidence on cross-task adaptation;




As a direct replication, this experiment closely followed the methods and procedures of the original
study. The few minor deviations from the original protocol are highlighted.
All participants performed two tasks parallel in a task switching setting: either a sentence-processing
task (Experiment 1) or a perceptual processing task (Experiments 2 and 3), intermixed with Stroop trials.
All the tasks included congruent (unambiguous) and incongruent (ambiguous) stimuli. The four
conditions were determined by the conflict state of the preceding and current stimulus: congruent–
congruent (cC); congruent–incongruent (cI); incongruent–congruent (iC); and incongruent–incongruent
(iI) sequences. All tests ended with a question asking whether the participant experienced any technical
problems or whether they have any comment on the experiment. All the materials are openly available
on the project’s OSF page: https://osf.io/6bd43/.2.2. Participants
According to our registration, we did not analyse the data until we collected at least 2.5 times the sample
size of the original experiment [29], which were 103, 70 and 38 participants for Experiments 1, 2 and 3,
respectively. Our first analyses did not provide good enough evidence for either H0 or H1; therefore, we
kept collecting data while regularly conducting the analyses.2 Since even with our greatly extended
sample, we did not reach our preset evidential thresholds for the crucial tests (for more details, see
the Results section of each experiment), we terminated data collection after reaching the end of our
timeframe. The first experiment has been conducted as a multi-site project. Together, 153 native






































1 In Experiments 2 and 3, we tested Hungarian native speakers as the stimuli were not specific to the
English language. We collected data from 178 and 94 participants, respectively.
Eligibility for participation in each experiment was based on age (greater than or equal to 18 years),
being a native speaker of the language of the test and being right handed. We did not collect any
identifiable private data during the project. Each laboratory ascertained that the local institutional
ethical review board agreed with the proposed data collection, which was conducted in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki.
2.3. Statistical analyses
Our data were nested (i.e. level of trials embedded into the level of participants); therefore, we calculated
aggregate scores within conditions for each participant and conducted all of the analyses on the level of
the individuals. Hence, our analyses were identical to those of the original paper. We performed and
reported all of our hypothesis tests as ANOVAs or paired-sample t-tests.3 The steps of the analysis of
the second and third experiments were similar to those of the first experiment. Therefore, we do not
provide a detailed description of the analyses of the second and third experiments, except where they
differ from the first experiment.
To test our hypotheses, we calculated Bayes factors (B), which is a measure of relative evidence provided
by the data for one model over another one (in our case, for H1 over H0). We used the Bayes factor instead of
frequentist statistics as the formerone can distinguish between insensitive evidence and evidence for the null,
whichmakes itmore appropriate for the purpose of this replication project.We applied the conventional cut-
off of 3 and ⅓ of B to differentiate good enough evidence for H1 and H0, respectively [30]. We reported
p-values along the Bs for each test. To calculate the Bs, we applied the R script of Dienes & Mclatchie [33]
that models the predictions of H1 in raw units rather than in standardized effect sizes. We modelled the
predictions of all H1s with half-normal distributions with a mode of zero as all of the alternative
hypotheses have directional predictions and they presume that smaller effects are more probable than
large ones [34]. Considering comparability of the Bs across experiments, we used the parameters of the
first experiments to model the predictions of the H1s of the second and third experiments (i.e. we used
identical parameters across all experiments for models testing the same hypothesis). The s.d. of the H1
models are specified and justified in the Results section of Experiment 1.
We notated the Bs as BH(0, x) in which H implies that the distribution is half-normal, 0 indicates the
mode of the distribution and x stands for the s.d. of the distribution that can vary among models. We
implemented all of our analyses with the R statistical software. For the NHST analyses, we used α =
0.05 across all analyses.
As a sensitivity test, we reported analyses on the arcsin-transformed proportions, following the
original procedure (electronic supplementary material, table S2).
2.4. General data pre-processing
For the reaction time (RT) analyses, we excluded the erroneous trials. After this exclusion, some participants
had no correct trials left in at least one of the four conditions (iI, iC, cC, cI). We excluded these participant’s
responses from both the RT and the accuracy analyses. After these exclusions, we were left with the data of
152 (Experiment 1), 163 (Experiment 2) and 88 (Experiment 3) participants for further analysis. We replaced
those Stroop trial RTswith their cut-off valuewhere the RTwas 2.5 s.d. slower or faster than the participants’
overall mean RT. We conducted the accuracy data analyses on the raw proportions.3. Experiment 1
3.1. Materials and procedure
Participants completed an intermixed sequence of Stroop and sentence trials. They read the sentences
word-by-word, advancing to the next word by pressing the keyboard spacebar. We used the same
sentences as the original research which were designed by Garnsey et al. [35], half of which are3Note that this differs from our Stage 1 registration where we planned to perform only t-tests. We performed ANOVAs for practical
reasons, but it has no effect on our results as 2 × 2 ANOVAs to test the interaction and the main effects lead to the same results as





































1 congruent and the other half incongruent (available on our OSF project site: https://osf.io/zkm2a/).
Incongruent sentences temporarily mislead the interpretation during the reading process, and
participants have to revise the content as they get to the end of the sentence. Congruent sentences are
not misinterpretable and they do not need cognitive-control supported reanalysis.
Example sentences from Kan et al. [13]:
— ‘The basketball player accepted the contract would have to be negotiated’. (Temporally incongruent/
ambiguous)
— ‘The basketball player accepted that the contract would have to be negotiated’. (Congruent/
unambiguous)
In the incongruent sentence, the verb ‘accept’ can be interpreted as if its direct object is the noun
‘contract’; however, as the participants encounter the ‘would have’ part, they have to reanalyse the
meaning of the sentence. This feature is expected to increase the reading time due to processing
difficulty. According to the original paper, this is the central source of conflict in the sentence task.
By inserting ‘that’ in the sentence, we diminished the possibility of temporal misinterpretation.
We used a pseudo-randomized sequence of 162 experimental trials (60 congruent and 60 incongruent
Stroop trials, as well as 21 congruent and 21 incongruent sentences). A total of 29 filler sentences were
included to avoid expectation-driven strategies and for the easy adaptation to the same type of
experimental sentences. All filler sentences were unambiguous. Non-filler trials had four conditions
that described the conflict state of the preceding and the current trial (cC, cI, iC, iI).
In Stroop-tests, participants used their dominant hand to submit their answers via button presses.
Three adjacent keyboard buttons were marked with blue, green and yellow patches. Colour names
matched with the ink colour in congruent trials, and mismatched in incongruent trials, but
mismatching colour names were response-ineligible. We used only colour names that are not in the
response set (e.g. brown, orange). Incongruencies such as this generate conflict in the representational
level, and not the response level [26]. We measured RT in milliseconds and accuracy of the Stroop
trials. In every experiment, the participants performed a practice sequence with all the possible
stimulus types before each trial.
Every trial started with a 500 ms fixation period which was followed by either a Stroop or a sentence
stimulus. The Stroop stimuli stayed on screen for 1000 ms. Sentence stimuli started with a full mask
(dashes replacing every letter of the sentence) and words appeared by the participants’ spacebar
presses on the keyboard. Only one word was visible, the recent parts of the sentence were also
masked. Word reading duration was recorded. After every trial, an empty inter-trial interval was
shown for 1000 ms. After the inter-trial interval of certain filler sentences, a comprehension probe
appeared and remained on the screen until the participant submitted a true or false answer. After the
response, a 1500 ms blank screen preceded the next trial.
Before the experimental sequence, there were 10 Stroop trials which helped participants learn the
keyboard mappings for the colour responses. It was followed by a baseline trial with 145 intermixed
congruent, incongruent and filler (not colour word) Stroop stimuli. The sentence tasks were preceded
by comprehension probe filler sentences to demonstrate the step-by-step nature of sentence stimuli.
Subsequently, an extra practice sequence was presented with 10 Stroop and 10 filler sentence stimuli
pseudo-randomly intermixed. Practice sequences contained only filler stimuli without any incongruency.3.2. Data pre-processing
The data of those participants who experienced any technical problems during the experiment and of
those who performed under 70% level of comprehension probe trials were not included in any of the
analyses.4 Therefore, we excluded 20 participants from Experiment 1. To mitigate the influence of
outlier RTs, we replaced the raw reading times of those trials (words) that are 2.5 s.d.s above the
participant’s mean word reading time across all the sentences with the 2.5 s.d. cut-off value of the
participant. In order to account for the biasing effect of the length of the word on the reading time,
we calculated the residual reading time for each word. For every sentence region (see in the OSF
repository of the project: https://osf.io/2v39r/) of each participant, we applied a simple linear
regression with the actual reading time as the outcome variable and the length of the region in the



































1 sentences (N = 29) in the linear regression, as measures of normal reading time.5 From this calculation, we
excluded the reading times of the incongruent sentences as the ambiguity manipulation is expected to
make these times longer than the normal reading time. To compute the residual reading time of the
sentence regions of every sentence for each participant, we subtracted the predicted reading time of
the given sentence region from the actual reading time. If a sentence region consisted of more than
one word, we averaged the residual reading times of the words. For a more detailed description, see
the electronic supplementary materials. For both of the RT and accuracy analyses, we only included
Stroop trials that were preceded by a sentence reading trial. .org/journal/rsos
R.Soc.Open
Sci.8:1913533.3. Results
3.3.1. Outcome neutral tests
Of the 132 participants who scored above or equal to 70% on the sentence comprehension probe test, the
mean comprehension score was 0.85 (s.d. = 0.1). Moreover, 145 participants scored above chance level on
the comprehension probe test with a mean comprehension score of 0.82 (s.d. = 0.12).
We tested the presence of the ambiguity effect by comparing the mean residual reading times of
congruent and incongruent sentences in each sentence region separately. For the comparison, we used
a one-tailed paired t-test where for the alternative hypothesis, we expected the mean residual reading
time to be greater for the incongruent than for the congruent sentences. To model the predictions of
the H1s, we used (as for all following analyses) a half-normal distribution, centred at 0 with s.d.s
taken from the effect sizes of the original study. These values are 40 and 18 ms for the temporarily
ambiguous and disambiguating regions, respectively. For the other sentence regions (sentence region
1, 2, 5, 6 and 7), we used the more conservative 18 ms raw effect size as our scale as it is less lenient
towards the H0. We used the data of 132 participants for each sentence region comparison. We found
strong evidence for the difference between the congruent and incongruent sentences in residual
reading time, with the incongruent one being longer, in the temporarily ambiguous sentence region:
M = 17.26 ms, BH(0,40) = 7.87 × 10
6, RR [0.6, 6.13 × 103] (t131 = 6.40, p < 0.01), and we found weak
evidence for the difference for the disambiguating region: M = 7.56 ms, BH(0,18) = 2.88, RR [17.20, 1.73 ×
102] (t131 = 2.05, p = 0.02).
6 We also found strong evidence for a difference in the mean residual reading
time in the fifth sentence region but not in the other sentence regions. Electronic supplementary
material, figure S1A and table S1A show the difference in the mean residual reading time for all
sentence regions.
We tested the presence of the Stroop effect in the RT data by comparing the RTs of congruent and
incongruent trials. The s.d. of the distribution modelling the predictions of H1 were 28 ms, which was
the size of the Stroop effect in the original study. We found a Stroop effect with M = 38.75 ms,
BH(0,28) = 4.61 × 10
13, RR [0.8, 1.45 × 104] (F1,131 = 87.03, p < 0.01).3.3.2. Crucial tests
The two key analyses (i.e. tests of the presence of congruency sequence effect) are the tests of the
interaction between the congruency of the current Stroop trial and the congruency of the preceding
sentence reading trial on the RT and accuracy data. We modelled a 30 ms s.d. for the RT analysis and
0.03 s.d. for the accuracy analysis for H1. Both of the values are equal to the raw effect sizes found in
the original study. The congruency sequence effect for the RT analysis was inconclusive M = 3.88 ms,
BH(0,30) = 0.37, RR [0, 33] (F1,131 = 0.35, p = 0.56), while we found good enough evidence for an effect
for the accuracy analysis with M = 0.05, BH(0,0.03) = 10.60, RR [0.0095, 0.28] (F1,131 = 6.50, p = 0.01).
Figure 1 shows the mean RT results and figure 2 shows the mean accuracy results, both broken down
by the congruency type of the preceding sentence and current Stroop trials.5As a sensitivity analysis, we recalculated the residual reading times with the inclusion of the incongruent and congruent sentences.
The detailed description of the sensitivity analysis can be found in the electronic supplementary material.
6The results of the sensitivity analysis showed a similar pattern. We found a difference between the congruent and incongruent
sentences in the temporarily ambiguous sentence region BH(0,40) = 4.55 × 10
6, RR [0.59, 5.89 × 103] (t131 = 6.29, p < 0.01). For the
outcome neutral test, we found good enough evidence for the difference in the disambiguating region with BH(0,18) = 3.33, RR [2.6,
20] (t131 = 2.12, p = 0.02). For the sensitivity test, electronic supplementary material, figure S1B and table S1B show the difference in


















Figure 1. The figure shows the mean RT broken down by the congruency type of the preceding and current trials for Experiment
1. The X-axis shows the congruency type of the previous trial, while the Y-axis shows the mean RTs. The legend shows the















Figure 2. The figure shows the mean accuracy results broken down by the congruency type of the preceding and current trials for
Experiment 1. The X-axis shows the congruency type of the previous trial, while the Y-axis shows the accuracy. The legend shows the





































1 3.3.3. Supporting tests of interest
We found evidence for the presence of the interaction between the congruency of the current and
preceding trials in the accuracy analysis; therefore, we conducted further comparisons to test whether
congruency sequence effect modulated the performance on congruent, incongruent or all trials. To
explore this, we tested whether the type of the preceding trial modulates the accuracy rates of current
congruent and incongruent trials. To model the H1s, we used the parameters of the test of the
interaction. For the comparisons, we used a one-tailed paired-sample t-test. In the iI and cI trial
comparison, we expected the iI trials to have a higher mean accuracy rate, whereas in the cC and iC
trial comparison, we expected the cC trials to have a higher mean accuracy rate. The results show that
the mean accuracy of the iI trials was higher than cI trials M = 0.05, BH(0,0.03) = 960.63, RR [0.0036,
14.30] (t131 = 4.21, p < 0.01), while we found evidence for no difference between the cC and iC trials
M =−0.0045, BH(0,0.03) = 0.30, RR [0.027, Inf ] (t131 =−0.37, p = 0.64).
We analysed the mean differences in RT broken down by the congruency type (congruent,
incongruent) of the preceding sentence trial. To model the H1 in the Bayes factor analysis, we used
the same prior as for the Stroop main effect of the current trial (s.d. = 28). The result of the test was
inconclusive with M = 4.28 ms, BH(0,28) = 0.53, RR [0, 44] (F1,131 = 1.97, p = 0.16).4. Experiment 2
In accordance with the original paper, we also tested domain-general congruency sequence effect with
the non-verbal Necker cube task. In this task, participants passively watched congruent and




































1 incongruent Necker cube stimuli. According to Kan et al. [13] and the referenced supporting literature
[32,34,36], the passive observation of the bistable Necker cube induces several alterations of the cube’s
perceived direction. These alterations are experiences of a visual conflict only and the participants are
not instructed to solve this conflict, only to indicate every alteration of the cube’s mental direction.
The number of direction reversals varied between individuals; therefore, the authors of the original
paper hypothesized that the scale of congruency sequence effect is dependent on the size of
experienced ambiguity shown by the number of reversals.Open
Sci.8:1913534.1. Materials and procedure
Participants viewed congruent and incongruent Necker stimuli pseudo-randomly intermixed with Stroop
stimuli. Participants used their non-dominant hands to respond to Necker trials and their dominant hand
to respond to Stroop trials. This allowed them to respond to trials without any movement across the
keyboard. On incongruent Necker trials, participants indicated with button press how they perceive the
direction of the cube (right-downward or left-upward) and they pressed the according button every time
they experienced a direction change. On congruent Necker trials, participants were asked to indicate the
direction of the stimulus as quickly as possible. The two corresponding keyboard buttons were labelled
with stickers depicting the two directions of the Necker cube.
Before the experimental part, 10 Stroop and seven Necker stimuli were shown to familiarize
participants with the two tasks. A baseline block was presented with 54 intermixed congruent and
incongruent Stroop trials.
In the experimental block, 200 total trials were included. The above-mentioned four experimental
conditions were generated by a pseudo-randomized sequence of 48 congruent Necker stimuli (24
downward, 24 upward), 28 incongruent Necker stimuli (figure 3), 62 congruent Stroop stimuli and 62
incongruent Stroop stimuli. The original study used a pseudo-randomized order of Necker and Stroop
Stimuli in the experimental block. As we did not know the order of the trials in the original study, we
created six blocks of pseudo-randomized sequences. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of
the sequences. Each trial began with a 500 ms fixation period and it was followed by either a Stroop or a
Necker stimulus. Stroop trials stayed on the screen for 1000 ms as in Experiment 1. Incongruent Necker
stimuli were shown for 90 000 ms. During this period, participants were instructed to press the matching
button whenever their directional interpretation changes. Congruent Necker stimuli remained on screen
for 1000 ms and every trial was followed by a 1000 ms inter-trial interval.4.2. Data pre-processing
We assigned participants to high and low reversal groups based on a median-split of the mean number of
reversals they experienced on incongruent Necker trials. The mean number of reversals for the high
reversal group was 18.61 (s.d. = 15.92; N= 81), while in the low reversal group, it was 3.10 (s.d. = 2.25;
N= 82). We found a difference of 15.51 between low and high reversal groups, in comparison to the
expected difference of 16 based on what was reported in the original study. We conducted the
analyses only on those Stroop trials that directly followed Necker trials.4.3. Results
4.3.1. Outcome neutral tests
We found a Stroop effect in the RT analysis with M = 44.60 ms, BH(0,28) = 8.08 × 10
18, RR [0.69, 1.70 × 104]
(F1,162 = 122.98, p < 0.01).
high reversal group low reversal group






















Figure 4. The figure shows the mean RT broken down by the congruency type of the preceding and current trials in the high and
the low reversal groups for Experiment 2. The X-axis shows the congruency type of the previous trial, whereas the Y-axis shows the
mean reaction times. The legend shows the congruency type of the current sentence trials. The error bars represent the 95%
confidence interval.
high reversal group low reversal group


















Figure 5. The figure shows the mean accuracy results broken down by the congruency type of the preceding and current trials in
the high and the low reversal groups for Experiment 2. The X-axis shows the congruency type of the previous trial, while the Y-axis






































1 4.3.2. Crucial tests
The results of the two-way interactions (preceding and current trial type) were inconclusive with
M = 12.6 ms, BH(0,30) = 1.81, RR [0,180] (F1,162 = 2.95, p = 0.09) for the RT analysis and with M =−0.0019,
BH(0,0.03) = 0.50, RR [0, 0.05] (F1,162 = 0.01, p = 0.92) for the accuracy analysis. Electronic supplementary






































1 We tested three-way interactions including the reversal group variable on the accuracy and RT data.
The results of the RT analysis showed evidence for no effect M =−10.90 ms, BH(0,30) = 0.28, RR [24.3, Inf ]
(F1,161 = 0.55, p = 0.46), while the accuracy analysis was inconclusive with M =−0.05, BH(0,0.03) = 0.45, RR
[0, 0.05] (F1,161 = 1.82, p = 0.18). Figure 4 shows the mean RT results and figure 5 shows the mean accuracy
results, both broken down by the congruency type of the preceding sentence and current Stroop trials for
the high and low reversal groups.
4.3.3. Supporting tests of interest
We tested the extent of the Stroop effect broken down by the congruency type (congruent, incongruent)
of the preceding sentence trial for the RT analysis. We found the effect for the congruency of the previous
trial: M = 46.59 ms, BH(0,28) = 1.26 × 10
11, RR [1.08, 1.73 × 104] (F1,162 = 65.84, p < 0.01. RTs were slower
when the preceding trial type was incongruent regardless of the current trial congruency type.
Finally, as a supporting analysis, we estimated the extent to which perceived ambiguity (measured as
the mean number of experienced reversals) and congruency sequence effect (iI–cI of accuracy rates and
RTs) correlated. To estimate the effect size, we calculated a Pearson correlation with the 95% Bayesian
credibility interval assuming a uniform prior distribution. The plausible effect sizes are small for both
the RT: r =−0.02, 95% CI [−0.17, 0.13] and accuracy analysis: r = 0.06, 95% CI [−0.10, 0.21]. The
correlation between the mean experienced reversals and the congruency sequence effect is shown in
electronic supplementary material, figure S4 for the RT analysis and electronic supplementary
material, figure S5 for the accuracy analysis.535. Experiment 3
Originally, Experiment 3 was meant to show that the congruency sequence effect in the Necker cube task
would not occur without the experience of internal conflict. Here, the design is identical to Experiment 2
regarding the timings and the order of trials; however, the 90 s incongruent Necker stimulus was
replaced by 90 s of periodically switching congruent Necker stimuli (upward and downward). This
design aimed to make the number of reversals experimentally controlled for the incongruent Necker
cube trials. The authors of the original paper used the results of Experiment 2 to define the frequency
of congruent Necker stimuli. In the original research, high reversal participants’ average frequency of
reversals was 27.6 so we showed 28 changes in direction for each 90 s period. We divided the 90 s
time period into 28 time intervals with random length (min = 0.289 s; max = 7.445 s) and changed the
direction of the unambiguous Necker cube in each time interval. We used the same time intervals
throughout the study for all participants. Each participant saw the left facing unambiguous Necker
cube first. Participants completed the same practice and the baseline sequences as in Experiment 2.
5.1. Data pre-processing
We assessed the level of attention to the Necker cube trials and, using the cutting point of the original
study, we excluded the data of participants whose performance was below 70% on accurately
identifying whether or not a stimulus change occurred on the current trial. Therefore, we excluded
eight participants from further analysis, and we were left with 80 participants after all the exclusions.
We included only those Stroop trials in the analyses that were preceded by a Necker trial.
5.2. Results
5.2.1. Outcome neutral tests
As an outcome neutral test, we calculated the Stroop effect of the current trial for the RT analysis.
We found an effect with good enough evidence M = 44.29, BH(0,28) = 7.40 × 10
7, RR [1.5, 1.58 × 104]
(F1,79 = 51.74, p < 0.01).
5.2.2. Crucial tests
We conducted two-way interactions to test the congruency sequence effect as part of the crucial tests.
Both the RT analysis M = 1.67, BH(0,30) = 0.36, RR [0, 32] (F1,79 = 0.03, p = 0.87), and the accuracy


















Figure 6. The figure shows the mean RT broken down by the congruency type of the preceding and current trials for Experiment
3. The X-axis shows the congruency type of the previous trial, while the Y-axis shows the mean reaction times. The legend shows















Figure 7. The figure shows the mean accuracy results broken down by the congruency type of the preceding and current trials for
Experiment 3. The X-axis shows the congruency type of the previous trial, while the Y-axis shows the accuracy. The legend shows the





































1 Figure 6 shows the mean RT results and figure 7 shows the mean accuracy results of the test of the
congruency sequence effect.5.2.3. Supporting tests of interest
As a supporting test of interest, we tested the main effect of the congruency of the previous Necker cube
trial on the mean differences in RT. We found an effect with M = 74.93 ms, BH(0,28) = 1.99 × 10
12, RR [1.8,
27740] (F1,79 = 98.12, p < 0.01)6. Discussion
The present replication study investigated the domain-generality of the congruency sequence effect. By
replicating the design of Kan et al. [13], we expected that the results would reveal the strength of
evidence behind a prominent claim of domain-generality.
We collected data from three countries with nearly four times the sample size of the original study for
Experiment 1, where Stroop task trials followed garden-path sentences. The data showed that the
participants complied with the instructions, reflected by the presence of the Stroop effect and
the longer RTs in the ambiguous regions of the incongruent sentences compared to the same region
of the congruent sentences. The crucial tests brought partial support for the cross-task congruency
sequence effect. While the RT results were inconclusive, nearly reaching our threshold for evidence for
no effect, the accuracy results were in line with the original finding as the Bayesian analyses showed
evidential support for the effect. Follow-up analyses showed that this finding was the result of
Table 1. Summary of our findings. Note: ✓, support for the presence of the congruency sequence effect (CSE); ‘, support




Exp. 1 — ✓
Exp. 2 — —
Exp. 2 (reversals) ‘ —





































1 increased accuracy on incongruent trials when they came after incongruent sentences compared to when
they came after congruent ones.
In Experiment 2, where the sentence task was replaced by Necker cubes in the design, we collected
data from more than six times the original sample size. Still, the results remained inconclusive for both
the RT and the accuracy tests of the congruency sequence effect. Furthermore, we found good enough
evidence for no effect in the RT results when we tested whether perceiving more Necker cube
reversals led to a greater congruency sequence effect.
In Experiment 3, where the orientation of the Necker cube was periodically switched by the testing
programme, the analyses drove inconclusive results. The RT and accuracy data did not support the
presence of the cross-task congruency sequence effect. In fact, the RT results nearly passed our preset
evidential threshold for no effect. Originally, this experiment was intended to demonstrate the lack of
effect since there would be no internal representational conflict experienced by the participants. Since
in this replication, we found no evidence for congruency sequence effect in Experiment 2, this
experiment adds relatively little to our primary aims.
Summarizing our findings, first we can conclude that our replication was successfully implemented
in accordance with our plan. Our outcome neutral tests provide strong evidence to suggest that our
participants understood and followed the instructions and they produced the expected default Stroop
effect. Second, we found that our crucial tests brought only partial support for the claims of the
original study. However, as table 1 shows, with only a single exception, we could not replicate the
original findings. The data remained inconclusive or went against the hypothesis.
The results are surprising from several aspects. Should the original results not be chance findings, one
would expect more supportive evidence across three experiments, particularly given our increased
sample size. Bayes factor analyses indicate that the data, with one exception, were far from supporting
the alternative hypothesis. Results frequently provided support for the null hypothesis.
We consider the evidence for congruency sequence effect in the accuracy results of Experiment 1 of
particular interest. The theoretical interest in this supportive finding is whether the observed effect in the
garden-path task can indicate the cross-domain nature of the congruency sequence effect. That is,
whether readers’ detection of syntactic conflict enhances cognitive control in another domain. As we
discussed it in Introduction, the domain-specificity account assumes that the overlap of stimulus
dimensions between the conflict tasks is a central determinant of the transfer of control [5,8,12].
Should we regard the sentence-processing task and the Stroop task to differ in their domain (syntactic
versus non-syntactic) then our results of Experiment 1 provide partial evidence that control adaptation
can work across domains. The interpretation is weaker if we regard the two to be more similar in
nature. The original authors themselves pointed out that despite the difference in stimulus
characteristics, both tasks are verbal. In fact, this motivated them to test the effect between perceptual
and verbal domains in Experiments 2 and 3. If the effect is domain-general, then it remains a question
regarding why the incongruent Necker cube did not decrease the congruency effect. One possibility is
that the ambiguity in the Necker cube does not lead to cognitive conflict; therefore, it is not a good
test of the effect. Either way, we consider that the positive result of Experiment 1 is noteworthy for
the theory and it, together with the lack of support for the null in other analyses, prevents us from
completely rejecting the domain-general hypothesis of the congruency sequence effect. In fact, the
results are also somewhat in-line with the finding of a new study that used Flanker-trials and code-
switch manipulation on sentences [37]. They have found evidence of an RT interaction between





































1 One limitation of this study is that it replicated the experiments on a different population and due to
the anonymous data collection, we could not compare the demographics of the original sample to the
replication sample.
The results brought up some new questions for further investigations. First of all, it remains
unexplained why RT data of Experiment 1 were in sharp contrast with the original findings, being
very far from detecting the congruency sequence effect between the two tasks. One could speculate
that enhanced control after incongruent sentence trials manifested in participants’ higher motivation
for accuracy which could increase the time needed to spend on the incongruent Stroop trials,
counteracting any speeding effect. However, our pattern of results does not support this speculation,
as we measured a lower accuracy rate than the original study and after the incongruent trials, the
mean RTs are not slower than after the congruent trials. Alternatively, if the effect is domain-specific,
then the positive accuracy results seek an explanation of a different scope.
It is worth noting that investigating the evidence for the cross-task congruency sequence effect is
interesting not just for the domain-generality debate, but it is also relevant to the research on the
mechanisms of cognitive control. According to the Conflict Monitoring Theory [3], the detection of
conflict is what triggers subsequent cognitive control. By contrast, the Affective Signaling Hypothesis
[38] suggests that it is not conflict per se that is responsible for control adaptation, but the negative
affect that this conflict triggers. In this view, the experience of conflict evokes a negative affective
reaction and this affect is what elicits the performance-monitoring system to upgrade control resources
leading to the attenuation of further conflict. From this alternative framework, it is plausible that
reading incongruent garden-path sentences causes phasic negative affect, so we would expect control
adaptation on subsequent trials. It is less clear, however, whether watching incongruent Necker cubes
is a source of negative affect. It is possible that the lack of elicited negative affect in that design is
behind the lack of evidence for the congruency sequence effect in Experiment 2. Here, it is relevant to
note that our results should not be generalized to other experimental arrangements. It is possible that
different designs can be more sensitive to detect the cross-task congruency sequence effect [37,39–41].
Future research should consider applying cross-task designs to test the predictions of the Affective
Signaling Hypothesis.
In sum, this study provides a registered replication of three experiments testing the congruency
sequence effect between two tasks. We could not replicate the original positive results, except in one
measure in Experiment 1. In our interpretation, this pattern of findings weakens, but does not fully
reject the hypothesis that the effect can occur across domains. We suggest that failure to detect control
adaptation after the Necker cube might reflect that the two designs differ not just in the domain of
the trigger trial but also in other characteristics, such as the affect the trigger trials induce, drawing
attention to alternative frameworks of control adaptation.
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